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The correct procedure for commencing an action in the Industrial Relations Division of
the High Court: Edward Chilufya Mwansa and 194 Others v. Konkola Copper Mines Plc
SCZ Appeal No. 99/2015 and Concrete Pipes v. Kingsley Kaimba and Another SCZ Appeal
No. 014/2015
Chanda Chungu 1
Facts
In Edward Chilufya Mwansa and 194 Others v. Konkola Copper Mines Plc, the Supreme Court
dealt with a scenario where several employees had been dismissed and sought to enter an out
of court settlement with their employer, through the assistance of the Labour Office. This
process lasted over three years.
In Concrete Pipes v. Kingsley Kaimba and Another, the Supreme Court dealt with an appeal
from a Ruling of the Industrial Relations Court dismissing a preliminary issue in relation to the
need to exhaust internal administrative channels before commencing an action before the court.
Holding
The Supreme Court in Edward Chilufya Mwansa was of the view that seeking to pursue an excuria settlement does not halt the 90-day period from running. The Supreme Court in a
judgment delivered by Malila JS (as he was then) held as follows:
In this case, the appellants (the employees) could well have commenced their
action in the Industrial Relations Court while they pursued a settlement on a
clear understanding that such actions would be discontinued if and when a
settlement were reached.
The case thereby fortified the position that the 90-day period only begins to run when the
internal administrative channels have been exhausted and once the period has been exhausted,
seeking an out of court settlement does not stop the 90-day period from running.
In Concrete Pipes, the Supreme Court guided that it is imperative for an employee to exhaust
all internal administrative channels before proceeding to court unless the channels are nonexistent or are unduly prolonged or totally ineffective.
Significance
Section 85(3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act provides that:
The court shall not consider a complaint or an application unless the complainant or
applicant present the complaint or application to the court –
(a) Within ninety days of exhausting the administrative channels available to
the complainant or applicant; or,
(b) Where there are no administrative channels available to the complainant
or applicant, within ninety days of the occurrence of the event which gave
rise to the complaint or application Provided that –
(i) Upon application by the applicant, the court may extend the period
in which the complaint or application may be presented before it.
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From the above, there are two legs to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Division of the
High Court. Firstly, the Industrial Relations Division can only hear a dispute if it is brought
within ninety (90) days (‘the 90 day rule’). Secondly, it must be brought within 90 days
exhausting all administrative channels or where there are no such channels, within 90 days
from the date when the dispute or event occurred (‘the exhaustion of administrative channels
rule’).
Section 85 (3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act is mandatory when it provides that a
complaint must all available administrative channels and bring the claim within ninety (90)
days. The use of the word “shall” clearly indicates that exhausting administrative channels is
mandatory. This point was brought out by Malila JS (as he was then) on behalf of the Supreme
Court in Edward Chilufya Mwansa.
On the importance of this rule, in a matter that involved section 85 (3) of the Industrial and
Labour Relations Act, the Supreme Court in Rajagopalan Kothanda Raman v Jenala Ngwira
stated that:
In the absence of rules as a guiding factor, confusion and anarchy would reign, as
litigants would do their own thing, at their own time and in their own way.
The Supreme Court in this case also stated that rules are there for a purpose, to ensure orderly
conduct of court proceedings, fair play between all the parties involved in the litigation and
control by the court of the whole process, without which real justice would prove to be elusive.
In the Edward Chilufya Mwansa case, the employees failed in reaching a settlement but were
nonetheless barred from bringing a claim in the Industrial Relations Court because the 90-day
period had elapsed. Further, based on the Supreme Court case of Eustone David Chola, an
application to extend the time within which to bring a complaint before the court shall be
entertained if filed within the said 90-day period, and will only be granted if there is good
reason.
The Supreme Court’s approach in Edward Chilufya Mwansa is significant because it clearly
illustrates that where a matter has been referred to an authorised officer, an employee can still
approach the court because the mandatory period runs. As such the 90-day rule is a strict one.
The approach in Edward Chilufya Mwansa is a correct one based on other decisions of the
Supreme Court. In Eustone David Chola v. Attorney General, the employee filed his claim
nine (9) years after his dismissal. The Supreme Court confirmed that section 85(3) does not
give the Industrial Relations Court any discretion to proceed with trial of a matter which is
brought outside the mandatory time to bring the complaint.
As it relates to the rule on exhausting administrative channels, the exhaustion of administrative
channels rule, prior to the Concrete Pipes case, the Supreme Court in Lackson Mukuma and
43 Others v Barclays Bank Limited, 2 held that:
As correctly observed by the Industrial Relations Court in its judgment in this matter,
the requirements of Section 85(3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act as
amended by Act No. 8 of2008 are that for a complaint to be considered, it should be
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presented within 90 days of exhausting the administrative channels available to a
complainant or within 90 days from the occurrence of the event.
The Supreme Court in Lackson Mukuma further stated that:
What Section 85 (3) (a) does, in our considered view, is to place the onus on a
complainant to show that they were pursuing administrative procedures 90 days prior
to the filing of the complaint. Parliament cannot be expected to legislate on when
administrative procedures in the various work places should commence as such
procedures are provided for in the Grievance and Disciplinary Procedure Codes of the
various institutions or contracts of employment and differ from institution to institution.
From the above, the rule on exhausting administrative channels is mandatory before a matter
can be commenced before the Industrial Relations Division of the High Court. In Concrete
Pipes and Products Limited v Kingsley Kabimba and Christopher Simukoko, 3 The Supreme
Court highlighted the importance of exhausting all administrative channels before commencing
litigation when Malila JS (as he was then) on behalf of the Supreme Court held that:
It is, of course, significant and advisable that an employee who believes that he has
been wrongfully dismissed or has had his employment unlawfully terminated on
account of his conduct, should ensure that the available internal disciplinary channels
are exhausted before he proceeds to commence legal action. The proceedings of the
disciplinary hearing help to ‘clear the decks’ and give the court additional material to
chew on in determining the efficacy of the complaint. Exhausting available grievance
redress procedures will also give the parties an opportunity to narrow or altogether clear
possible misunderstanding or misperceptions. It also offers an important opportunity to
the employee to explain himself on allegation of misfeasance before the ultimate
sanction – dismissal – is meted out against him by the employer. In this sense,
adherence to any such procedure is imperative.
The case of Concrete Pipes and Products Limited emphasised that exhausting internal and
other available grievance procedures gives the employer and employee the opportunity to
narrow or even possibly clear possible misunderstandings or misperceptions and also offers an
important opportunity to the employee to explain himself on allegations of misconduct before
dismissal is meted out against him by the employer.
The Supreme Court also guided that an employee need not subject him- or herself to any
internal administrative disciplinary procedures if they are non-existent. This accords with
section 85(3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act which guides that an employee can
proceed directly to court where there are no administrative channels available.
We wish to point out that notwithstanding the above, Industrial Relations Division in several
cases such that of Lungwani Choombe & 11 Others v. African Banking Corporation (Z)
Limited, 4 held that section 85 and the substantive provision of the Industrial Relations Court
Act no longer apply to the Industrial Relations Division following the Constitutional
Amendment that made it a division of the High Court. In reference to the GDC Logistics case,
the court held that only the Industrial Relations Rules made pursuant to the Act apply to the
new court whilst the substantive provisions of the High Court Act will prevail.
3
4

SCZ Appeal No. 014/2015.
Comp/IRCLK/15/2018.

52

The net result of the Lungwani Choombe judgment is that rules such as the need for substantial
justice, having employment matters brought to court within 90 days, judgment being passed
with within 60 days of the complaint being filed no longer apply to the Industrial Relations
Division. The court was very clear to emphasise that the Industrial Relations Division of the
High Court must be distinguished from the former Industrial Relations Court. The Lungwani
Choombe decision has been followed in several subsequent Industrial Relations Division
decisions and thus the position of the court is that an applicant can file their Notice of
Complaint outside the mandatory period following the amendment to the Constitution.
The author of this article disagrees with the approach of the Industrial Relations Division in
recent cases on the strength of the Constitutional Court’s decision in Zambia National
Commercial Bank Plc v. Martin Musonda & 58 Others 5 confirmed that whereas the Industrial
Relations Court is now a Division of the High Court, the Constitution provides that the
procedure for specialised courts is prescribed in specialised Acts of Parliament. The
Constitutional Court held:
For avoidance of doubt, the Industrial Relations Court Rules promulgated under
statutory instrument No. 206 of 1974 continue to govern the processes and procedures
including the commencement of actions before the Industrial Relations Court Division
of the High Court.
The Court held that because a specific piece of legislation has not been drafted to regulate the
Industrial Relations Division, the Court will be governed by the Industrial and Labour
Relations Act and Industrial Relations Court Rules until new legislation is enacted.
A slight critique of the decision in Concrete Pipes is the failure of the court to deal with the
employment dispute within the context of section 85(3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations
Act. The Supreme Court further guided that
…an aggrieved employee need not subject himself to any internal administrative
disciplinary procedures where these are non-existent, or are unduly prolonged or totally
ineffective. Unreasonable refusal for an employee to subject himself to disciplinary
procedures could of course have its own repercussions. The extent to which the
employee’s choice not to submit to internal administrative disciplinary proceedings
may react upon the merit of his case, will of course vary from case to case depending
on the peculiar circumstances.
The Supreme Court went further to state that
Our view nonetheless is that refusal to subject oneself to internal disciplinary
procedures goes to the credibility of the complaint in court, rather than to the cause of
action itself. In other words, a cause of action is not necessarily lost by reason merely
of the fact that internal administrative disciplinary proceedings were not concluded or
acceded to. In our estimation, failure or refusal to follow or to subject oneself to
disciplinary procedures can only go either to strengthening or to weakening the
employee’s complaint against the employer
5
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Had the Supreme Court considered section 85(3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act
within its proper context, the Supreme Court would have held that the failure to exhaust
administrative channels which are available to an employee robs the court of jurisdiction to
hear a matter. As highlighted above, exhaustion of available administrative channels is a
mandatory requirement and if an employee fails to exhaust these before proceeding to court,
the court cannot have jurisdiction to hear the matter. The Supreme Court stated that
Unreasonable refusal for an employee to subject himself to disciplinary procedures
could of course have its own repercussions
It is the author’s view that the refusal to submit to administrative channels that are available is
fatal and the repercussions are that the court cannot hear the matter. As such, contrary to the
Supreme Court’s position that the consequences will of course vary from case to case
depending on the peculiar circumstances, a correct reading of section 85(3) of Industrial and
Labour Relations Act is the inability of the court to consider and determine any complaint or
application before it. Therefore, the consequences for failure to exhaust all available
administrative channels would be for the court to dismiss the action.
In employment matters before the Industrial Relations Division, it is the exhaustion of available
channels and the 90-day rule that give the court jurisdiction. A Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction it does not have. In the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex
Oil (Kenya) Limited, 6 the Court stated thus:
Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step.
Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of
proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law down tools in respect of the matter
before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in Elias Tembo v Florence Chiwala Salati & Others 7 stated that ‘we want
to reiterate here that jurisdiction is everything, without it, the Court has no power to make any
further step.’ As such, if the Industrial Relations Division proceeds to hear any matter brought
outside the mandatory 90-day period following the exhaustion of administrative channels, it
would be doing so without jurisdiction. It is only when the employee has no administrative
channels available may he/she proceed directly to court.
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